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ARGUMENT
I.

Response to Standards of Review,
The parties agree on the standards of review on Issues 1, 2 and 4. However, for

Issue #3 (Did Judge Quinn improperly reconsider Judge Hilder's Ruling on the mandate
rule under the law-of-the-case doctrine?) the parties have presented differing authority.
McLaughlin offered the correctness standard. Cookietree and Schenk state that the
proper standard of review is abuse of discretion.
In response, and to reply to the arguments in the Brief of Appellee, p. 21-23,
McLaughlin believes the most correct and complete statement of the appropriate standard
of review is found in In the matter o/RK,

2006 UT 36, f 32, 33; 137 P.3d 809.

"A challenge to a judge's reversal of a ruling made by a predecessor judge
is inevitably composed of two issues. The first concerns whether the
reversal so offends the prudential practice of refusing to reopen matters that
have already been decided that it cannot be sustained. Messenger v.
Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). This question is central to evaluating
the application of the law of the case doctrine and [] is ordinarily reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. The second component of an inquiry
into a reversal of a prior order focuses on the nature of the matter decided.
For example, if both the original ruling and the one that displaced it were
based on applications of law each would be reviewed under a correctness
standard. When a legal question is presented to an appellate court in law-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of-the-case packaging, a potential dilemma can arise over which standard of
review to apply. We can identify no reason why an erroneous legal
determination should be afforded greater discretion on appeal merely
because it wears the garb of law of the case. For purposes of review, then,
considerations of law of the case must yield to those of the substance of the
underlying ruling when ascertaining the proper standard of review,"
So "[initially, [the appellate court] determines whether the trial judge abused his
discretion in revisiting a matter previously decided by another judge. [T]hen [the
appellate court] reviews the substance of the second judge's decision, which in this case is
an issue of law that we review for correctness." In the matter ofR.B.F.S., 2012 UT App
132,f8;278P.3dl43.
Judge Quinn inherited a seven-year-old case. The issues on which he ruled had
been (expensively and extensively) briefed and decided already. Rl815-2371 In the
very first proceeding over which Judge Quinn presided, he made clear he would
"certainly not take the same position that Judge Hilder did." R3502, p. 11 The reason
this was an abuse of discretion is because he also stated "[t]he efforts to remedy what
took place in 2005 have no effect on what ultimately happens in this case1 . . . " and "that
remand instruction was explicit. Do I have any discretion at all to consider the other two
possibilities that are set forth in the statute, one of which is director's action by qualified
directors, the other [] of which is shareholder's action? I think that I do." R3503, p. 3
^ 3 5 0 2 , p. 11
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2

Lower courts do not have discretion to consider other possibilities than those
directed by a mandate. Lower courts (and parties) must follow mandates of the appellate
court. Secondly, the "efforts to remedy what took place in 2005" is exactly what the
holding of McLaughlin v. Schenk 2009 UT 64, 220 P.3d 146 {"McLaughlin F or "the
Opinion") was all about. In 2005 Schenk as a board member and shareholder attempted
to waive the stock transfer restrictions and ratify the disputed stock transfer from which
he personally benefitted. This economically harmed Sam McLaughlin. McLaughlin I,
f38. If that action was fair (i.e. "beneficial to the corporation and the shareholders and
whether they satisfied the standard of fair dealing ") Sam McLaughlin will not be able to
recover damages for being economically harmed. If, on the other hand, the 2005 Waivers
are determined by a finder of fact to be unfair, McLaughlin /provides remedies for Sam
McLaughlin. The Opinion cited the Judicial Action statute and the Model Act3. Id.
Statutory remedies include "enjoin[ing] .. . set [ting the transaction] aside, or . . . an
award of damages or other sanctions." Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-851(2). Under the
Model Act, if a transaction is deemed to be unfair "the transaction may be subject to the
full range of remedies that might apply." Model Business Corporation Act, Commentary,
8-155. The Opinion also endorsed equitable relief. McLaughlin I fn4.
Therefore Judge Quinn abused his discretion when he said "[t]he efforts to remedy
what took place in 2005 have no effect on what ultimately happens in this case" and that
McLaughlin /, f3 8.
This position on damages was argued and preserved in the record below at
R2399-2400.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he had discretion on remand to look at other possibilities. Looking at the second layer,
the correctness of his interpretation of the mandate, the standard of review also cannot be
met. See Argument, p. 6 - 9 below.
II.

Response to Statement of the Case and Statements of Fact.

^

In their Brief, Cookietree and Schenk recharacterized and argued an interpretation
of facts in the case prior to McLaughlin I and remand. Brief of Appellees, p. 3 - 6.
\

These facts should no longer be at issue and should be controlled by the facts found in the
Opinion, most relevantly contained in McLaughlin I f3, 6, 10, 11, 38.
With regard to post-remand facts, McLaughlin strongly disputes the conclusion

<

that "Greg Schenk did not participate in the post remand actions." Brief of Appellees, p.
7, 12. Indeed Greg Schenk initiated the 2009 Board action, which was done "at his
i

request." The post-remand Disclosure Statement, prepared by lawyers for Schenk and
Cookietree and distributed to Cookietree shareholders, characterized the Opinion.
R2870-71 Then, the Disclosure Statement stated:
"Greg Schenk has requested that the Board and the Shareholders vote on
whether or not to waive the Transfer Restriction Provisions."
R2871 Greg Schenk was present at the Board meeting and discussed all the issues with
the Board. Immediately after Rudd's allegedly "sole, disinterested vote" Greg Schenk
ratified Rudd's actions and attested to the Minutes, where Greg Schenk's signature
appears. R1833
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With respect to the 2010 Shareholder Action, Schenk again voted to waive the
stock transfer provisions in the Shareholder Agreement. He did this because, before the
2010 Shareholder Action could "constitute a waiver by the shareholders, Proposal 1
needed to be approved by not less than two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding
shares, including Greg Schenk's shares..." Brief of Appellee, p. 14-15.
It is not true, especially under the principles of close corporation duty set forth in
McLaughlin /, for anyone to assert Greg Schenk did not participate in the post-remand
action.
III.

Response to Arguments.
The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether or not the district court,

Cookietree, Inc. and Greg Schenk followed the mandate(s)4 of this Court in McLaughlin
I Tf 38 or violated it by procuring and recognizing the 2010 Waivers. On remand, the
parties each interpreted the remand directive differently. McLaughlin presented his
position to Judge Hilder, and he agreed with McLaughlin's view of the remand directive.
Cookietree and Schenk later reargued the same issues, and Judge Quinn agreed with their
interpretation. This appeal must resolve the question.

4

In addition to the mandate in ^[38 remanding for a a fact-intensive fairness hearing,
another mandate was contained in the Opinion: that Cookietree's "stockholders must
discharge their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with th[e]
strict good faith standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and the corporation."
McLaughlin I ^[18, 22.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

The Mandate in McLaughlin I.

McLaughlin I did not remand for the majority shareholder and the corporation he
controls to decide which option under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851(2)(a)-(c) they
wished to apply. The mandate was for a fact-intensive fairness hearing to be held by the
district court. The Opinion articulates the remand directive in four paragraphs:
Paragraph 1: "we hold that waivers executed by the board and the
shareholders of the corporation were contaminated by a conflict of interest,
and we therefore remand for a determination of whether the waivers were
fair." McLaughlin I ^ 1 .
Paragraph 31: "we acknowledge the waivers were tainted by a conflict of
interest and thereby remand for a determination of whether they were fair."
Mf31.
Paragraph 38: "We therefore remand for a determination of whether the
waivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-10a-851,
which is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers were
beneficial to the corporation and the shareholders and whether they
satisfied the standard of fair dealing. See Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. ch. 8F, § 8.605." Id. f38.
Paragraph 42: "we conclude that the waivers ratifying the 1999 share
transfer were contaminated by a conflict of interest and remand for a
determination of whether the waivers were fair." Id. <|42.
In addition to following the plain meaning of these paragraphs, the McLaughlin / Judge
Hilder interpretation also comports with both the "letter and the spirit" of the Opinion and
"the circumstances it embraces." Utah Dep't Transportation v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, f 12,
218 P.3d 583; Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.} 2004 UT 34, ^[5, 98 P.3d 409.

5

This portion of the Model Act cited in the Opinion defines and articulates the fairness
standard and contains definitions. Section 8.60 does not discuss Directors Action or
Shareholders action. See R2456-2473 (reproduced in the Addendum hereto).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The reasoning behind the specific remand directive for a fairness hearing is found
throughout the Opinion as a whole.
Cookietree is a close corporation with 65% of the company's stock controlled by
Greg Schenk, President of the Board. McLaughlin /, f 6. In 1998, Schenk was a 49%
shareholder. Id. Schenk acquired 545,200 additional shares of Cookietree stock via the
disputed stock transaction, bringing his ownership to 65%. Id. The disputed stock
transfer did not conform to first right of refusal provisions in the controlling Shareholder
Agreement. Id. p 1. McLaughlin sued for breach and to enforce the first right of refusal
provisions. Id. ^ 10.
The Shareholder Agreement allowed the share; transfer provisions to be waived,
"upon the express written consent of the owners of at least two-thirds of the shares . . .
(excluding those shares owned by the selling shareholder.)" Id. f30. So, in 2005, after
McLaughlin sued for breach of the Shareholder Agreement, the full Board (including
Schenk) and certain of the shareholders (including Schenk) voted to waive the first right
of refusal provisions and ratify the disputed stock transfer. Id. fl 1. In so doing, "Schenk
and the other board members and voting shareholders deprived the company and the
nonvoting shareholders [McLaughlin] the economic opportunity to increase their
investment in [Cookietree]. Id. f38.
"Greg Schenk [] clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer
restrictions of the Shareholder Agreement..." Id. ^[38. His participation "taints" and
"contaminates" the waivers and ratifications. Id. fl, 31, 38, 42. A waiver by a two-thirds
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<

shareholder vote is not possible because Greg Schenk owns 49% of all authorized
Cookietree shares,6 excluding the 545,200 disputed shares. Any vote including Greg

'

Schenk will be tainted. Any vote excluding Greg Schenk can't meet the two-thirds
requirement in the Shareholder Agreement. This is why the Opinion (immediately before
articulating the remand directive) noted that "[t]he [Shareholder] Agreement failed [] to
foresee the possible conflicts presented when a buyer is already a corporate shareholder
and votes to waive the restrictions on share transfers." Id f38. Both Cookietree9s

I

Shareholder Agreement and corporate law are "wary of such self dealing." Id. f38. The
2010 Shareholder vote is just as tainted and problematic as the 2005 Shareholder vote by

<

the unavoidable participation of Greg Schenk. McLaughlin I foresaw this when it
mandated the fairness hearing.
In contrast to this reasoned approach, Cookietree and Schenk's analysis of the
remand directive ignores the letter and spirit and also the circumstances of the Opinion.
The one sentence relied upon by Cookietree and Schenk in support of their interpretation

{

of the remand directive is found in paragraph 37. That sentence does not contain the
word "remand;" indeed, the sentence is a description of subsections (a) (b) and (c) of
Section 851(2): "The procedures provided in the conflict of interest statute most
appropriately address nontransaction-related conflict situations because they do not
i

automatically invalidate conflict of interest transactions but instead require the party with

6

This pivotal point was conceded by Cookietree and Schenk on remand and in its present
Brief. R1917; Brief of Appellees, p. 14-15,27
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a conflict to [a.] show the transaction was fair, or [b.] require the vote of disinterested
board members or [c require the vote of] disinterested shareholders to ratify the
transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851 (2005)." The Opinion never cites Section
852 or 853, where Directors Action and Shareholders Action are described. This
sentence does not "specifically authorize" the path Greg Schenk and Cookietree took on
remand. The remand sentences of this Court's opinion all refer to the fairness
determination, a separate subsection. McLaughlin I, p , 31, 38, 42.
The Utah Supreme Court best knows what it intended by the mandate in
McLaughlin L Greg Schenk, Cookietree and Judge Quinn diverted from that mandate
and instead took alternative and "discretionary" measures. Sam McLaughlin should be
given the full, hard fought benefit of McLaughlin /when this matter is remanded a
second time.
B.

Not Only Did the Post-Remand Board Action and
Director's Action Thwart the Mandate, But Those
Actions Were Themselves Flawed.
1.

The Fatal Flaws with the 2009 Board Action.

Cookietree's Board has only three directors: Greg Schenk, Harold
Rosemann and David Rudd. In the (20 minute) post-remand board meeting, all three
were present, constituting a quorum. R1829 All three directors including Schenk
engaged in a discussion of the disputed stock transfer, the Opinion and the proposed
waivers and ratifications. Rl829-1830 Two board members (Schenk and Rosemann)
then abstained from voting, citing conflict of interest. Rl 829-1830 The action then
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1

undertaken, by Rudd alone, to ratify the 2005 Waivers and presently waive the stock
transfer provisions in the Shareholder's Agreement violated Cookietree's Bylaws and
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-824(3). To be a valid act of the Board, the action of a majority
of directors present was required. R1856 A majority of the directors present at the postremand Board meeting did not vote; a majority of directors present abstained
In addition to this facial flaw, McLaughlin also launched a substantive
attack on the adequacy of Rudd's knowledge and information. On appeal, McLaughlin
has properly marshaled the disputed facts surrounding the adequacy of the disclosures
made to Rudd and in his basic understanding of the facts. Opening Brief p. 20-23. The
Brief of Appellee accuses undersigned counsel of "blatantly mischaracterizing" the
deposition of David Rudd. The record shows that David Rudd was deposed through the
use of open-ended questions, designed to discover what Mr. Rudd actually knew or
understood about the issues. R2324-2347 An illustrative example is:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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\

Question to Mr. Rudd

Mr. Rudd's Answer

Accuracy

Could you describe th[e
disputed stock] transfer of
Cookietree shares for me?
R2326, p. 6

The shares were offered to the
company, the company went
through a process of
reviewing who was entitled to
purchase those shares. . . .
The board at the time, from
what I can see, went through a
process of evaluating the;
respective rights of the
company, and the shareholder
had obtained the waivers, both
on a board level and a
shareholder's level, to the
stock transfer provisions and
Mr. Schenk purchased the
shares. That's my
understanding.

Completely wrong.
"This transfer was
not recorded in
Cookietree's minutes
or written records,
and a right of first
refusal was not
provided to the
j
corporation or the
other shareholders.
Stock certificates
were nonetheless
issued. At the time
this transfer was
made, it violated the
1991 Shareholder
Agreement.
McLaughlin I, ^}6.

Do you know or are you
I don't know.
able to tell me whether the
transfer provisions in the
19997 shareholder
agreement were followed
in the case of the transfer
between Anna Schenk and
Greg Schenk in 1999?
R2329, p. 18

After Rudd testified for over an hour in response to open ended questions, his counsel
asked to take a break. R2335 Mr. Rudd (after confemng with counsel) corrected his

7

As noted in the Opinion, the provisions in the 1991 and 1999 Shareholders Agreements
are identical. McLaughlin /, ^[30, 32.
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testimony and more accurately described events. A fair reading of Mr. Rudd's deposition
as a whole indicates that he did not have an independent grasp on the basic factual
elements of these issues. He parroted what counsel told him, both in and out of the
deposition. A reading of the deposition as a whole supports this conclusion, which Sam
McLaughlin and undersigned counsel stand behind here.
After Rudd's sole (misinformed, puppeted) action, Greg Schenk and Harold
Rosemann (who minutes earlier acknowledged their conflict of interest) ratified the
ratification of the 2005 Waivers and the new, present waiver of the stock transfer
provisions. Rl 830-1831 To allow disqualified directors to discuss, then abstain, then
ratify summary board action is the elevation of form over substance in its worst form. It
mocks the other holding of McLaughlin I: that Schenk, Rosemann and the other
shareholders in Cookietree "owe[] McLaughlin individually a duty to act in the utmost
o

good faith ." McLaughlin I f l .
2.

The Fatal Flaws with the 2010 Shareholder Action.

As set forth above, the 2010 Shareholder Action was tainted by Greg
Schenk's participation and any shareholder action purporting to waive the share transfer
restrictions will necessarily be either tainted or fail to meet the two-thirds requirement.
The fact that the so-called "Election Judge" (the same Harold Rosemann who disqualified

8

McLaughlin has never argued there is a new, post-remand unpled cause of action for
breach of fiduciary duty. C.f Brief of Appellee, p. 23-26. Instead, McLaughlin argued
below that to uphold the post-remand waivers and ratifications would violate this holding
of McLaughlin /which also binds the parties and the court below. R1825, R3003-3004,
R3502, p. 9-10, R3503, p. 13-14, 22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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himself for conflict of interest in the post-remand Board meeting) tallied the votes with
and without Greg Schenk's votes is of no consequence. The Shareholder Agreement
requires that two thirds of the shareholders not including the selling shareholder must
vote to effectively waive the stock transfer restrictions. R2565, 2569 This can never
happen without Greg Schenk.
As to the other post-remand shareholder votes and ratification, the Opinion
recognized that, in this close corporation, it would be impossible to put the genie back in
the bottle. By the time of remand, the dispute over Greg Schenk's undisclosed
acquisition of the 545,200 shares had been plaguing McLaughlin, Cookietree and its
closed group of shareholders for seven years. Everyone is well aware of this proceeding.
With one exception, the post-remand Cookietree shareholders who voted are current atwill employees of Greg Schenk. R2124 They are all very much aware Sam McLaughlin
was terminated from Cookietree employment when he disagreed with and challenged
Greg Schenk. At the post-remand Board meeting, Harold Rosemann (a shareholder,
director and employee) "stated that although he did not believe that his status as an
employee of the Company would exert any influence on his vote as a director, he did
acknowledge that his relationship with Greg Schenk likely could have an influence on his
vote and create a conflict of interest for him in voting." Rl 829-1830 It is difficult to see
why, after acknowledging one shareholder/employee could be unduly influenced by Greg
Schenk and a conflict of interest created but other shareholder/employees would not be
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so-influenced. The only way to reasonably resolve this dispute and the issues created by
Greg Schenk's self-interested actions is through a fairness hearing.
CONCLUSION
This Court should remand for a fairness hearing per the mandate of McLaughlin L
To hold otherwise now would sanction Schenk's and Cookietree's shell game, which
lacked the elements of good faith and fair dealing. Greg Schenk's procurement of and
participation in the post-remand waiver and ratification action should not be allowed to
stand in light of this Court's prior holdings and mandate.
STATEMENT REGARDING ATTACHMENTS
Undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the materials attached hereto as
Addendum A are part of the record on remand. Utah R. App P. 24(a)(4).
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Appellant's Reply Brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App.
P. 24(f)(1)(A) because it contains 3,385 words, excluding the caption, Table of Contents
and Table of Authorities.
DATED this 17 th day of September, 2012.

Margaret H. Olson, Esq., Of Counsel
Lincoln W. Hobbs, Esq.
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant Sam McLaughlin
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MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Subchapter F.
DIRECTORS1 CONFLICTING INTEREST
TRANSACTIONS
1.

PURPOSES AND SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
SUBCHAPTER F

The common law, drawing by analogy on thefiduciaryprinciples of the law of trusts, initially took the position that any
transaction between a corporation and a director of that corporation was contaminated by the director's conflicting interest, that
the transaction was null and void or at least voidable and, suggesting by implication, that the interested director who benefited
from the transaction could be required to disgorge any profits and
be held liable for any damages.
Eventually, it was perceived that a flat( void/voidable rule
could work against a corporation's best interests. Although selfinterested transactions carry a potential for injury to the corporation, they also carry a potential for benefit. A director who is
self-interested may nevertheless act fairly, and there may be cases
where a director either owns a unique asset that the corporation
needs or is willing to offer the corporation more favorable terms
than are available on the market (for example, where the director
is more confident of the corporation'sfinancialability to perform
than a third person would be). Accordingly, the courts dropped
the flat void/voidable rule, and substituted in its stead the rule
that a self-interested transaction will be upheld if the director
shoulders the burden of showing that the transaction was fair.
Later still, the Model Act and the state legislatures entered
the picture by adopting statutory provisions that sheltered the
transaction from any challenge that the transaction was void or
voidable where it was approved by disinterested directors or
shareholders. Until 1989, the successive Model Act provisions
concerning director conflict-of-interest transactions and the statutory provisions in force in most states reflected basically the
same objective; that is, their safe-harbor procedures concentrated
on protection for the transaction, with no attention given to the
possible vulnerability of the director whose conflicting interest
would give rise to the transaction's potential challenge. However,
in 1989 the relevant provisions were significantly reworked in
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subchapter F of Chapter 8. Four basic elements in the architecture
of the 1989 version of subchapter F distinguished the approach
of the subchapter from most other statutory provisions of the time.
First, most other statutory provisions did not define what constituted a director's conflict-of-interest transaction. In contrast,
subchapter F defined, with bright-line rules, the transactions that
were to be treated as director's conflict-of-interest transactions.
Second, because most other statutory provisions did not define what constitutes a director's conflict-of-interest transaction,
they left open how to deal with transactions that involved only a
relatively minor conflict. In contrast, subchapter F explicitly provided that a director's transaction that was not within the statutory
definition of a director's conflict of interest transaction was not
subject to judicial review for fairness on the ground that it involved a conflict of interest (although circumstances that fall outside the statutory definition could, of course, afford the basis for
a legal attack on the transaction on some other ground), even if
the transaction involved some sort of conflict lying outside the
statutory definition, such as a remote familial relationship.
Third, subchapter F made explicit, as many other statutory
provisions did not, that if a director's conflict-of-interest transaction, as defined, was properly approved by disinterested (or
"qualified") directors or shareholders, the transaction was
thereby insulated from judicial review for fairness (although,
again, it might be open to attack on some basis other than the
conflict).
Fourth, subchapter F also made explicit, as no other statutory
provisions had done, that if a director's conflict-of-interest transaction, as defined, was properly approved by disinterested (or
"qualified") directors or shareholders,' the conflicted director
could not be subject to an award of damages or other sanctions
with respect thereto (although the director could be subject to
claims on some basis other than the conflict).
Bright-line provisions of any kind represent a trade-off between the benefits of certainty, and the danger that some transactions or conduct that fall outside the area circumscribed by the
bright-lines may be so similar to the transactions and conduct that
fall within the area that different treatment may seem anomalous.
Subchapter F reflected the considered judgment that in corporate
matters, where planning is critical, the clear and important effi8-135
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ciency gains that result from certainty through defining director's
conflict-of-interest transactions clearly exceeded any potential
and uncertain efficiency losses that might occasionally follow
from excluding other director's transactions from judicial review
for fairness on conflict-of-interest grounds.
The 2004 revisions of subchapter F rest on the same basic
judgment that animated the original subchapter. Accordingly, the
revisions made do not alter the fundamental elements and approach of the subchapter. However, the revisions refine the definition of director's conflict-of-interest transactions, simplify the
text of the statute, and, within the basic approach of the original
subchapter, make various clarifying and substantive changes
throughout the text and comments. One of these substantive
changes expands the category of persons whose interest in a transaction will be attributed to the director for purposes; of subchapter
F. At the same time, the revisions delete coverage of a director's
interest that lies outside the transaction itself but might be deemed
to be "closely related to the transaction." The latter phraseology
was determined to be excessively vague and unhelpful. In combination, these revisions clarify the coverage of subchapter F,
while ensuring that a transaction that poses a significant risk of
adversely affecting a director's judgment will not escape statutory
coverage.
2.

SCOPE OF SUBCHAPTER F

The focus of subchapter F is sharply defined and limited.
First, the subchapter is targeted on legal challenges based on
interest conflicts only. Subchapter F does not undertake to define,
regulate, or provide any form of procedure regarding other possible claims. For example, subchapter F does not address a claim
that a controlling shareholder has violated a duty owed to the
corporation or minority shareholders.
Second, subchapter F does not shield misbehavior by a director or other person that is actionable under other provisions of
the Model Act, such as section 8.31, or under other legal rules,
regardless of whether the misbehavior is incident to a transaction
with the corporation and regardless of whether the rule is one of
corporate law.
Third, subchapter F does not preclude the assertion of defenses, such as statute of limitations or failure of a condition
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precedent, that are based on grounds other than a director's conflicting interest in the transaction.
Fourth, the subchapter is applicable only when there is a
"transaction" by or with the corporation. For purposes of subchapter F, "transaction" generally connotes negotiations or consensual arrangements between the corporation and another party
or parties that concern their respective and differing economic
rights or interests—not simply a unilateral action by the corporation or a director, but rather a "deal." Whether safe harbor
procedures of some kind might be available to the director and
the corporation with respect to non-transactional matters is discussed in numbered paragraph 4 of this Introductory Comment.
Fifth, subchapter F deals with directors only. Correspondingly, subchapter F does not deal with controlling shareholders
in their capacity as such. If a corporation is wholly owned by a
parent corporation or other person, there are no outside shareholders who might be injured as a result of transactions entered
into between the corporation and the owner of its shares. However, transactions between a corporation and a parent corporation
or other controlling shareholder who owns less than all of its
shares may give rise to the possibility of abuse of power by the
controlling shareholder. Subchapter F does not speak to proceedings brought on that basis because section 8.61 concerns only
proceedings that are brought on the ground that a "director has
an interest respecting the transaction."
Sixth, it is important to stress that the voting procedures and
conduct standards prescribed in subchapter F deal solely with the
complicating element presented by the director's conflicting interest. A transaction that receives favorable directors' or shareholders' action complying with subchapter F may still fail to satisfy a different quorum requirement or to achieve a different vote
that may be needed for substantive approval of the transaction
under other applicable statutory provisions or under the articles
of incorporation, and vice versa. (Under the Model Act, latitude
is granted for setting higher voting requirements and different
quorum requirements in the articles of incorporation. See sections
2.02(b)(2) and 7.27.)
Seventh, a few corporate transactions or arrangements in
which directors inherently have a special personal interest are of
a unique character and are regulated by special procedural pro8-137
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visions of the Model Act. See sections 8.51 and 8.52 dealing with
indemnification arrangements, section 7.44 dealing with termination of derivative proceedings by board action and section 8.11
dealing with directors' compensation. Any corporate transactions
or arrangements affecting directors that are governed by such
regulatory sections of the Act are not governed by subchapter F.
3,

STRUCTURE OF SUBCHAPTER F

Subchapter F has only four parts. Definitions are in section
8.60. Section 8.61 prescribes what a court may or may not do in
various situations. Section 8.62 prescribes procedures for action
by boards of directors or duly authorized committees regarding a
director's conflicting interest transaction. Section 8.63 prescribes
corresponding procedures for shareholders. Thus, the most important operative section of the subchapter is section 8.61.
4.

NON-TRANSACTIONAL SITUATIONS INVOLVING
INTEREST CONFLICTS

Many situations arise in which a director's personal economic
interest is or may be adverse to the economic interest of the corporation, but which do not entail a "transaction" by or with the
corporation. How does the subchapter bear upon those situations?
Corporate opportunity
The corporate opportunity doctrine is anchored in a significant body of case law clustering around the core question whether
the corporation has a legitimate interest in a business opportunity,
either because of the nature of the opportunity or the way in which
the opportunity came to the director, of such a nature that the
corporation should be afforded prior access to the opportunity
before it is pursued (or, to use the case law's phrase, "usurped")
by a director. Because judicial determinations in this area often
seem to be driven by the particular facts of a case, outcomes are
often difficult to predict.
The subchapter, as such, does not apply by its terms to corporate or business opportunities since no transaction between the
corporation and the director is involved in the taking of an opportunity. However, new subchapter G of chapter 8 of the Model
Act provides, in effect, that the safe harbor procedures of section
8-138

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SECTION 8.59
8.62 or 8.63 may be employed, at the interested director's election, to protect the taking of a business opportunity that might be
challenged under the doctrine. Otherwise, subchapter F has no
bearing on enterprise rights or director obligations under the corporate opportunity doctrine.
Other situations
Many other kinds of situations can give rise to a clash of
economic interests between a director and the corporation. For
example, a director's personalfinancialinterests can be impacted
by a non-transactional policy decision of the board, such as where
it decides to establish a divisional headquarters in the director's
small hometown. In other situations, simple inaction by a board
might work to a director's personal advantage, or a flow of ongoing business relationships between a director and that director's
corporation may, without centering upon any discrete "transaction," raise questions of possible favoritism, unfair dealing, or
undue influence. If a director decides to engage in business activity that directly competes with the corporation's own business,
the economic interest in that competing activity ordinarily will
conflict with the best interests of the corporation and put in issue
the breach of the director's duties to the corporation. Basic conflicts and improprieties can also arise out of a director's personal
appropriation of corporate assets or improper use of corporate
proprietary or inside information.
The circumstances in which such non-transactional conflict
situations should be brought to the board or shareholders for
clearance, and the legal effect, if any, of such clearance, are matters for development under the common law and lie outside the
ambit of subchapter F. While these non-transactional situations
are unaffected one way or the other by the provisions of subchapter F, a court may well recognize that the subchapter F procedures provide a useful analogy for dealing with such situations.
Where similar procedures are followed, the court may, in its discretion, accord to them an effect similar to that provided by subchapter F.
* **

Note on Terms in Comment
In the Official Comments to subchapter F sections, the director who has a conflicting interest is for convenience referred to
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as "the director" or "D," and the corporation of which he or
she is a director is referred to as "the corporation" or "X Co."
A subsidiary of the corporation is referred to as "S Co." Another
corporation dealing with X Co. is referred to as 4 TCo."

§8,60. SUBCHAPTER DEFINITIONS
In this subchapter:
(1) "Director's conflicting interest transaction" means a
transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the
corporation (or by an entity controlled by the corporation)
(i)

to which, at the relevant time, the director is a
party; or

(ii) respecting which, at the relevant time, the director
had knowledge and a material financial interest
known to the director; or
(iii) respecting which, at the relevant timie, the director
knew that a related person was a party or had a
material financial interest.
(2) "Control" (including the term "controlled by") means
(i) having the power, directly or indirectly, to elect or
remove a majority of the members of the board of directors or other governing body of an entity, whether
through the ownership of voting shares or interests, by
contract, or otherwise, or (ii) being subject to a majority
of the risk of loss from the entity's activities or entitled
to receive a majority of the entit/s residual returns.
(3) "Relevant time" means (i) the time at which directors'
action respecting the transaction is taken in compliance with section 8.62, or (ii) if the transaction is not
brought before the board of directors of the corporation (or its committee) for action under section 8.62,
at the time the corporation (or an entity controlled by
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the corporation) becomes legally obligated to consummate the transaction.
"Material financial interest" means a financial interest
in a transaction that would reasonably be expected to
impair the objectivity of the director's judgment when
participating in action on the authorization of the transaction.
"Related person" means:
(i)

the director's spouse;

(ii) a child, stepchild, grandchild, parent, step parent,
grandparent, sibling, step sibling, half sibling,
aunt, uncle, niece or nephew (or spouse of any
thereof) of the director or of the director's spouse;
(Hi) an individual living in the same home as the director;
(iv) an entity (other than the corporation or an entity
controlled by the corporation) controlled by the
director or any person specified above in this subdivision (5);
(v) a domestic or foreign (A) business or nonprofit
corporation (other than the corporation or an entity controlled by the corporation) of which the
director is a director, (B) unincorporated entity of
which the director is a general partner or a member of the governing body, or (C) individual, trust
or estate for whom or of which the director is a
trustee, guardian, personal representative or like
fiduciary; or
(vi) a person that is, or an entity that is controlled by,
an employer of the director,
"Fair to the corporation" means, for purposes of section 8.61 (b)(3), that the transaction as a whole was
beneficial to the corporation, taking into appropriate
account whether it was (i) fair in terms of the director's
dealings with the corporation, and (ii) comparable to
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what might have been obtainable in an arm's length
transaction, given the consideration paid or received by
the corporation.
(7) "Required disclosure" means disclosure of (i) the existence and nature of the director's conflicting interest,
and (ii) all facts known to the director respecting the
subject matter of the transaction that a director free of
such conflicting interest would reasonably believe to
be material in deciding whether to proceed with the
transaction.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Committees of board of directors, see § 8.25.
Director action, see §§ 8.20 & 8.21.
"Entity" defined, see § 1.40.
Indemnification, see §§ 8.50-8.59.
"Proceeding" defined, see § 1.40.
Quorum and voting:
by directors, see § 8.24.
by shareholders, see §§ 7.25-7.27.
Shareholder action, see §§ 7.01-7.04.
Standards of conduct:
officers, see § 8.42.
Vote needed to approve transactions by shareholders:
amendment to articles of incorporation, see § 10.03.
disposition of assets, see § 12.02.
generally, see §§ 7.25 & 7.26.
mergers and share exchanges, see § 11.04.
"Voting group" defined, see § 1.40.
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OFFICIAL COMMENT
The definitions set forth in section 8.60 apply only to subchapter F's provisions and, except to the extent relevant to subchapter G, have no application elsewhere in the Model Act. (For
the meaning and use of certain terms used below, such as "D,"
"XCo." and "KCo.",see the Note at the end of the Introductory
Comment of subchapter F.)
1.

DIRECTOR'S CONFLICTING INTEREST TRANSACTION

The definition of "director's conflicting interest transaction"
in subdivision (1) is the core concept underlying subchapter F,
demarcating the transactional area that lies within—and without—the scope of the subchapter's provisions. The definition operates preclusively in that, as used in section 8.61, it denies the
power of a court to invalidate transactions or otherwise to remedy
conduct that falls outside the statutory definition of "director's
conflicting interest transaction" solely on the ground that the director has a conflict of interest in the transaction. (Nevertheless,
as stated in the Introductory Comment, the transaction might be
open to attack under rules of law concerning director misbehavior
other than rules based solely on the existence of a conflict of
interest transaction, as to which subchapter F is preclusive).
a. Transaction
For a director's conflicting interest transaction to arise, there
must first be a transaction effected or proposed to be effected by
the corporation or an entity controlled by the corporation to which
the director or a related person is a party or in which the director
or a related person has a materialfinancialinterest. As discussed
in the Introductory Comment, the provisions of subchapter F do
not apply where there is no "transaction" by the corporation—
no matter how conflicting the director's interest may be. For example, a corporate opportunity usurped by a director by definition
does not involve a transaction by the corporation, and thus is not
covered by subchapter F, even though it may be proscribed under
fiduciary duty principles.
Moreover, for purposes of subchapter F, "transaction" means
(and requires) a bilateral (or multilateral) arrangement to which
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the corporation or an entity controlled by the corporation is a
party. Subchapter F does not apply to transactions to which the
corporation is not a party. Thus, a purchase or sale by the director
of die corporation's shares on the open market or from or to a
third party is not a "director's conflicting interest transaction"
within the meaning of subchapter F because the corporation is
not a party to the transaction.
b. Party to the transaction—the corporation
In the usual case, the transaction would be effected by X Co.
Assume, however, that X Co. controls the vote for directors of S
Co. D wishes to sell a building D owns to X Co. and X Co. is
willing to buy it. As a business matter, it makes no difference to
X Co. whether it takes the title directly or indirectly through its
subsidiary S Co. or some other entity that X Co. controls. The
applicability of subchapter F does not depend upon that formal
distinction, because the subchapter includes within its operative
framework transactions by entities controlled by XCo. Thus, subchapter F would apply to a sale of the building by D to S Co.
c. Party to the transaction—the director or a related person
To constitute a director's conflicting interest transaction, D
(the director identified in the subchapter from time to time as a
"conflicted director") must, at the relevant time, (i) be a party to
the transaction, or (ii) know of the transaction and D's material
financial interest in it, or (iii) know that a related peirson of D was
a party to the transaction or (iv) know that a related person of D
has a material financial interest in the transaction. A material
financial interest (as defined in subdivision (4)) is one that would
reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director's
judgment if D were to participate in action by the directors (or
by a committee thereof) taken on the authorization of the transaction.
Routine business transactions frequently occur between companies with overlapping directors. If X Co. and Y Co. have routine, frequent business dealings whose terms are dictated by competitive market forces, then even if a director of .X" Co. has a
relevant relationship with Y Co., the transactions would almost
always be defensible, regardless of approval by disinterested di8-144
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rectors or shareholders, on the ground that they are "fair." For
example, a common transaction involves a purchase of the corporation's product line by Y Co., or perhaps by D or a related
person, at prices normally charged by the corporation. In such
circumstances, it usually will not be difficult for D to show that
the transaction was on arms-length terms and was fair. Even a
purchase by D of a product of X Co. at a usual "employee's
discount," while technically assailable as a conflicting interest
transaction, would customarily be viewed as a routine incident of
the office of director and, thus, "fair" to the corporation.
D can have a conflicting interest in only two ways.
First, a conflicting interest can arise under either subdivision
(l)(i) or (ii). This will be the case if, under clause (i), the transaction is between D and X Co. A conflicting interest also will
arise under clause (ii) if D is not a party to the transaction, but
knows about it and knows that he or she has a material financial
interest in it. The personal economic stake of the director must
be in the transaction itself—that is, the director's gain must flow
directly from the transaction. A remote gain (for example, a future
reduction in tax rates in the local community) is not enough to
give rise to a conflicting interest under subdivision (l)(ii).
Second, a conflicting interest for D can arise under subdivision (l)(iii) from the involvement in the transaction of a "related
person" of D that is either a party to the transaction or has a
"material financial interest" in it. "Related person" is defined
in subdivision (5).
Circumstances may arise where a director could have a conflicting interest under more than one clause of subdivision (1).
For example, if Y Co. is a party to or interested in the transaction
with X Co. and Y Co. is a related person of D, the matter would
be governed by subdivision (l)(iii), but D also may have a conflicting interest under subdivision (l)(ii) if D's economic interest
in Y Co. is sufficiently material and if the importance of the transaction to Y Co. is sufficiently material.
A director may have relationships and linkages to persons and
institutions that are not specified in subdivision (l)(iii). Such relationships and linkages fall outside subchapter F because the
categories of persons described in subdivision (l)(iii) constitute
the exclusive universe for purposes of subchapter F. For example,
in a challenged transaction between X Co. and Y Co., suppose the
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court confronts the argument that D also is a major creditor of Y
Co. and that creditor status in YCo. gives D a conflicting interest.
The court should rule that Z)'s creditor status in Y Co. does not
fit any category of subdivision (1); and therefore, the conflict of
interest claim must be rejected by reason of section 8.61(a). The
result would be different if Y Co.'s debt to D were of such economic significance to D that it would either fall under subdivision
(l)(ii) or, if it placed D in control of Y Co., it would fall under
subdivision (l)(iii) (because KCo. is a related person of D under
subdivision (5)(iv)). To explore the exampleftirther,if D is also
a shareholder of Y Co., but D does not have a material financial
interest in the transaction and does not control YCo., no director's
conflicting interest transaction arises and the transaction cannot
be challenged on conflict of interest grounds. To avoid any appearance of impropriety, D, nonetheless, should consider recusal
from the other directors' deliberations and voting on the transaction between X Co. and Y Co.
It should be noted that any director's interest in a transaction
that meets the criteria of section 8.60(1) is considered a "director's conflicting interest transaction." If the director's interest
satisfies those criteria, subchapter F draws no distinction between
a director's interest that clashes with the interests of the corporation and a director's interest that coincides with, or is parallel
to, or even furthers the interests of the corporation. In any of these
cases, if the director's "interest" is present, a "conflict" will
exist.
2,

CONTROL

The definition of "control" in subdivision (2) contains two
independent clauses. Thefirstclause addresses possession of the
voting or other power, directly or indirectly, to elect or remove a
majority of the members of an entity's governing body. That
power can arise, for example, from articles of incoiporation or a
shareholders' agreement. The second clause addresses the circumstances where a person is (i) subject to a majority of the risk
of loss from the entity's activities, or (ii) entitled to receive a
majority of the entity's residual returns. The second clause of the
definition includes, among other circumstances, complex financial structures that do not have voting interests or a governing
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body in the traditional sense, such as special purpose entities.
Although the definition of "control" operates independently of
the accounting rules adopted by the U.S. accounting profession,
it is consistent with the relevant generally accepted accounting
principle (made effective in 2003) that governs when an entity
must be included in consolidatedfinancialstatements.
3.

RELEVANT TIME

The definition of director's conflicting interest transaction requires that, except where he or she is a party, the director know
of the transaction. It also requires that where not a party, the
director know of the transaction either at the time it is brought
before the corporation's board of directors or, if it is not brought
before the corporation's board of directors (or a committee
thereof), at the time the corporation (or an entity controlled by
the corporation) becomes legally bound to consummate the transaction. Where the director lacks such knowledge, the risk to the
corporation that the director's judgment might be improperly influenced, or the risk of unfair dealing by the director, is not present. In a corporation of significant size, routine transactions in
the ordinary course of business, which typically involve decisionmaking at lower management levels, normally will not be
known to the director and, if that is the case, will be excluded
from the "knowledge" requirement of the definition in subdivision (l)(ii) or (iii).
4.

MATERIAL FINANCIAL INTEREST

The "interest" of a director or a related person in a transaction can be direct or indirect (e.g., as an owner of an entity or a
beneficiary of a trust or estate), but it must be financial for there
to exist a "director's conflicting interest transaction." Thus, for
example, an interest in a transaction between X Co. and a director's alma mater, or any other transaction involving X Co. and a
party with which D might have emotional involvement but no
financial interest, would not give rise to a director's conflicting
interest transaction. Moreover, whether afinancialinterest is material does not turn on any assertion by the possibly conflicted
director that the interest in question would not impair his or her
objectivity if called upon to vote on the authorization of the trans8-147
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action. Instead, assuming a court challenge asserting the materiality of the financial interest, the standard calls upon the trier of
fact to determine whether the objectivity of a reasonable director
in similar circumstances would reasonably be expected to have
been impaired by thefinancialinterest when voting on the matter.
Thus, the standard is objective, not subjective.
Under subdivision (l)(ii), at the relevant time at director must
have knowledge of his or herfinancialinterest in the transaction
in addition to knowing about the transaction itself. As a practical
matter, a director could not be influenced by afinancialinterest
about which that director had no knowledge. For example, the
possibly conflicted director might know about X Co.'s transaction
With Y Co., but might not know that his or her money manager
recently established a significant position in Y Co. stock for the
director's portfolio. In such circumstances, the transaction with
Y Co. would not give the director a "materialfinancialinterest",
notwithstanding the portfolio investment's significance. Analytically, if the director did not know about the Y Co. portfolio investment, it could not reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of that director's judgment.
Similarly, under subdivision (l)(iii), a director must know
about his or her related person's financial interest in the transaction for the matter to giveriseto a' 'materialfinancialinterest"
under subdivision (4). If there is such knowledge and "interest"
{i.e., the financial interest could be expected to influence the director's judgment), then the matter involves a director's conflicting interest transaction under subdivision (1).
5.

RELATED PERSON

Six categories of "related person" of the director are set out
in subdivision (5). These categories are specific, exclusive and
preemptive.
The first three categories involve closely related family, or
near-family, individuals as specified in clauses (i) through (iii).
The clauses are exclusive insofar as family relationships are concerned and include adoptive relationships. The references to a
"spouse" include a common law spouse. Clause (iii) covers personal, as opposed to business, relationships; for example, clause
(iii) does not cover a lessee.
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Regarding the subcategories of persons described in clause
(v) from the perspective of X Co., certain of D's relationships
with other entities and D's fiduciary relationships are always a
sensitive concern, separate and apart from whether D has a financial interest in the transaction. Clause (v) reflects the policy
judgment that D cannot escape D's legal obligation to act in the
best interests of another person for whom D has such a relationship and, accordingly, that such a relationship (without regard to
anyfinancialinterest on D*s part) should cause the relevant entity
to have "related person** status.
The term "employer*' as used in subdivision (5)(vi) is not
separately defined but should be interpreted sensibly in light of
the purpose of the subdivision. The relevant inquiry is whether
D, because of an employment relationship with an employer who
has a significant stake in the outcome of the transaction, is likely
to be influenced to act in the interest of that employer rather than
in the interest of X Co.
6.

FAIR TO THE CORPORATION

The term "fair** accords with traditional language in the case
law, but for purposes of subchapter F it also has a special meaning. The transaction, viewed as a whole, must have been beneficial to the corporation, in addition to satisfying the traditional
4
'fair price1 * and * 'fair dealing* * concepts. In determining whether
the transaction was beneficial, the consideration and other terms
of the transaction and the process (including the conflicted director* s dealings with the corporation) are relevant, but whether the
transaction advanced the corporation's commercial interests is to
be viewed "as a whole."
In considering the "fairness*' of the transaction, the court will
be required to consider not only the market fairness of the terms
of the deal—whether it is comparable to what might have been
obtainable in an arm*s length transaction—
but also (as the board would have been required to do)
whether the transaction was one that was reasonably likely to
yield favorable results (or reduce detrimental results). Thus, if a
manufacturing company that lacks sufficient working capital allocates some of its scarce funds to purchase a sailing yacht owned
by one of its directors, it will not be easy to persuade the court
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that the transaction was "fair" in the sense that it was reasonably
made to further the business interests of the corporation. The facts
that the price paid for the yacht was a "fair" market price, and
that the fall measure of disclosures made by the diirector is beyond
challenge, may still not be enough to defend and uphold the transaction.
<L Consideration and other terms of the transaction
The fairness of the consideration and other transaction terms
are to be judged at the relevant time. The relevant inquiry is
whether the consideration paid orreceivedby the corporation or
the benefit expected to be realized by the corporation was adequate in relation to the obligations assumed or received or other
consideration provided by or to the corporation. If the issue in a
transaction is the "fairness*' of a price, "fair" is not to be taken
to imply that there is one single "fair" pride, all others being
"unfair." It is settled law that a "fair" price is any price within
a range that an unrelated party might have been willing to pay or
willing to accept, as the case may be, for the relevant property,
asset, service or commitment, following a nonrnd arm's-length
business negotiation. The same approach applies not only to
gauging the fairness of price, but also to the fairness evaluation
of any other key term of the deal.
Although the "fair" criterion used to assess the consideration
under section 8.61(b)(3) is also a range rather than a point, the
width of that range may be narrower than would be the case in
an arm's-length transaction. For example, the quality and completeness of disclosures, if any, made by the conliicted director
that bear upon the consideration in question are relevant in determining whether the consideration paid orreceivedby the corporation, although otherwise commercially reasonable, was
"fair" for purposes of section 8.61(b)(3).
b. Process of decision and the director's conduct
In some circumstances, the behavior of the director having
the conflicting interest may affect thefindingand content of ''fairness." Fair dealingrequiresthat the director makerequireddisclosure (per subdivision (7)) at therelevanttime (per subdivision
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(3)) even if the director plays no role in arranging or negotiating
the terms of the transaction. One illustration of unfair dealing is
the director's failure to disclose fully the director's interest or
hidden defects known to the director regarding the transaction.
Another illustration would be the exertion by the director of improper pressure upon the other directors or other parties that might
be involved with the transaction. Whether a transaction can be
successfully challenged by reason of deficient or improper conduct, notwithstanding the fairness of the economic terms, will
turn on the court's evaluation of the conduct and its impact on
the transaction.
7.

REQUIRED DISCLOSURE

A critically important element of subchapter F's safe harbor
procedures is that those acting for the corporation be able to make
an informed judgment. In view of this requirement, subdivision
(7) defines "required disclosure" to mean disclosure of all facts
known to D about the subject of the transaction that a director
free of the conflicting interest would reasonably believe to be
material to the decision whether to proceed with the transaction.
For example, if D knows that the land the corporation is proposing to buy from D is sinking into an abandoned coal mine, D
must disclose not only D's interest in the transaction but also that
the land is subsiding. As a director of X Co., D may not invoke
caveat emptor. On the other hand, D does not have any obligation
to reveal the price that D paid for the property ten years ago, or
the fact that D inherited the property, because that information is
not material to the board's evaluation of the property and its business decision whether to proceed with the transaction. Further,
while material facts respecting the subject of the transaction must
be disclosed, D is not required to reveal personal or subjective
information that bears upon D's negotiating position (such as, for
example, D's urgent need for cash, or the lowest price D would
be willing to accept). This is true even though such information
would be highly relevant to the corporation's decisionmaking in
the sense that, if the information were known to the corporation,
it could enable the corporation to hold out for more favorable
terms.
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